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Cursor’s incident now covers two tampered Claude Code extension builds: 2.1.312 and 2.1.313. Expel saw reverse SSH tunnels on 4 Macs. Uninstalling may leave persistence, so check every Cursor machine. t.co/xfHGVUYJry t.co/3IVcXRXJyB #SupplyChainSecurity

Your registry trust means nothing if the build was compromised. Cosign signs and verifies container images with keyless or key-based workflows, plus admission policies and CI/CD hooks. t.co/ZVWUX7sZMW #cosign #sigstore #supplychainsecurity #python #devops #infra #redis #sharding #ValtersIT #snippet #infosec #SysAdmin #cybersecurity #Linux #devsecops #developer #100daysofcode #git #github #gitlab #redteam #blueteam #ethicalhacker #cybersecurityawareness #cybersecuritynews #cybersecuritytips #hacker #kali #ubuntu #debian #docker

AWS Lambda Node.js users must rebuild/redeploy to patch a critical Brotli vulnerability, preventing remote code execution. Update now. #supplychainsecurity #vulnerabilitymanagement #serverlesssecurity #nodejs

A marketplace pull does nothing for laptops that already have the extension. Cursor says a malicious Claude Code extension sat in its marketplace on October 29, potentially affecting up to 5,000 users. List every machine that had it. t.co/e02R2TGUM0 #SupplyChainSecurity

It's Friday night before Halloween. I'm sitting in my living room working on a brief I'm giving to the @OASWIBP ...not because I have to, but because I want to. Yes, I'm a nerd. Yes, it's that important. #SupplyChainSecurity #Reshoring

The official Claude Code extension was trojanized - and uninstalling it wasn't enough. #devsecops #supplychainsecurity #claudecode t.co/zKoRATxak4

Your development environment is part of your attack surface. A compromised IDE extension can execute malicious code without any AI interaction. Auto-updates and implicit trust deserve a rethink. #CyberSecurity #SupplyChainSecurity #AI

Florian Roth ⚡️@cyb3rops

Cursor users: check your Claude Code extension. Cursor confirms a trojanized Anthropic.claude-code v2.1.313 in its extension marketplace on 29 October, 09:27 to 20:35 UTC. It estimates up to 5,000 affected users and identifies macOS ARM64 and Windows x64 builds. Loading the extension executes malicious code that collects host information and attempts to install a persistent SSH backdoor. Cursor says SSH access would fail on most hosts due to bugs and insufficient privileges. That limits remote access; it doesn’t undo malicious code execution. Credentials and repositories accessible to that account are potentially at risk. The package has been removed and the C2 taken offline. Uninstalling the extension may still leave persistence behind. If this version ran, investigate the host, remove persistence and rotate accessible credentials from a clean system. Updating the extension alone doesn’t prove the machine is clean. The vendor-confirmed distribution channel is Cursor’s marketplace. Microsoft VS Code uses a separate store. These reports don’t establish a compromised Microsoft Marketplace or malicious npm release. My recommendation: turn off automatic extension updates completely - for yourself and for your developers. With supply chain attacks like this, I don’t think the benefit of another feature or a minor UI fix justifies automatically accepting every new release onto developer machines. Update manually when something stops working, when a bug is actually getting in your way, or when a relevant security fix needs to be applied. Otherwise, leave a working extension alone. Cursor advisory and cleanup instructions: https://t.co/dk9he5dYbG Technical analysis: https://t.co/clSK99WoGz

Gheist: stolen GitHub tokens push ci-sync-* branches whose workflow dumps your secrets. gh repo list ORG -L999|cut -f1|xargs -tI% gh api repos/%/git/matching-refs/heads/ci-sync- Note: Rotate repo+env secrets. Source: t.co/74Ai8D1RyK #SupplyChainSecurity #DevSecOps

Cursor says a tampered Claude Code extension (2.1.313) in its marketplace tried to plant an SSH backdoor. Removing it may leave persistence. Check affected hosts and follow Cursor's cleanup steps. #Cybersecurity #Infosec #SupplyChainSecurity t.co/u1QgJCc6wL

A backdoor naming its SSH key "svc-telemetry" is the most believable lie in tech. Got Claude Code 2.1.313 via Cursor's marketplace Oct 29? Uninstalling isn't enough: grep svc-telemetry ~/.ssh/authorized_keys Update to 2.1.314. Pin extensions. #ClaudeCode #SupplyChainSecurity

Gheist: 13,500+ branches, secrets base32-encoded past GitHub log masking. Testmetest: 13 MB payloads too big for code search, fired by AI coding tool hooks. Different campaigns. Same way in: stolen tokens. t.co/J5SX5Sf3Lb #DevSecOps #GitHub #SupplyChainSecurity

JFrog found 42 GitHub repos booby-trapped by the testmetest npm worm. Opening one in Claude Code, Cursor, Gemini or VS Code could run a hidden .github/init.js. Check repo configs before opening unfamiliar projects. #npm #SupplyChainSecurity #AIAgents t.co/MiOW40Houf

เช้านี้อ่านข่าว GitHub ปล่อย package firewall ให้ npm เช็ค policy ก่อน install ว่ะ บล็อก malware ที่รู้จัก ช่องโหว่ระดับ critical และเวอร์ชันที่เพิ่งออกใหม่ ตั้ง cooldown เองได้ ใครยังไม่ได้ใช้ ลอง minimumReleaseAge ของ pnpm หรือ Renovate ไปก่อน #DevSecOps #SupplyChainSecurity #npm

PHP2Shell flaws in network devices expose supply chain risks. Patching and holistic security are crucial as adversaries exploit underlying software. #networksecurity #vulnerabilitymanagement #supplychainsecurity #remotecodeexecution

Sources and Further Reading: Primary research from AIR Security, October 14, 2026 | t.co/FwJs3zzI9d Why a verified agent still needs every tool and destination checked, from the FLINT Academy | t.co/L6sYKKETbE #AgenticAI #SupplyChainSecurity #AppSec #PaymentRisk

LiteLLM's 1.107.0 compromise traces back to a key committed in May, deleted 3h later, never revoked. Deleting a secret from a repo doesn't remove it. Once pushed, it's burned: rotate first, clean history second. Source: t.co/R6INSvvabw #SupplyChainSecurity #AppSec

@ekcheungAI Downloads is a no-agent zone now, like the kitchen drawer full of mystery cables: nothing good ever gets launched from it. Repo root only, and any instruction file nobody invited gets carded at the door. #SupplyChainSecurity

Bloom Security found 1,500+ npm packages, 10M+ downloads, where a freed repo name could be reclaimed to hijack publishing trust. Their words: agents "take the latest version and rarely check where a package came from." t.co/J5oWFLIo4j #SupplyChainSecurity #AICoding

Not every supplier comes through procurement. Some start with a free account and quietly become business critical. Over 70% sit outside the official process. Can you see yours? 🔗t.co/aISYLKiZv7 Book a demo: t.co/5ALkqr7nHt #ThirdPartyRisk #SupplyChainSecurity

Fake "Apex Accelerator" npm packages (REF8801, per Elastic) register a malicious MCP server in your agent config and hijack LLM traffic, letting attackers read prompts and tool outputs, then inject instructions back. t.co/J5oWFLIo4j #MCP #SupplyChainSecurity